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EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE
EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE: A PRESIDENTIAL PILLAR
WITHOUT CONSTITUTIONAL SUPPORT *
THE CONSTITUTION MAKES NO MENTION of a congres-
sional power of investigation, nor of an executive privilege to
withhold information from Congress. Let me begin, therefore, with
some practical considerations. Congress and the President are
partners in government; Congress was designed to be the senior
partner, as the vast disparity between the numerous powers con-
ferred to the legislature and the meager few granted to the Presi-
dent should demonstrate.1 "No one doubted," Gordon Wood
states, "that the legislature was the most important part of any gov-
ernment." 2 As late as 1791, Justice James Wilson, second only to
Madison as an architect of the Constitution, stated in his lectures
here in Philadelphia, that the executive had been an object of
"aversion and distrust," because governors had been saddled on the
colonists by the Crown.2 He counseled that it was time to sur-
mount such distrust because like the assemblies, the governors were
now elected by the people.4
It offends common sense to maintain that one partner may
conceal information from the other in the alleged interest of the
partnership. Until recent legislation called for disclosure, execu-
tive agreements, which were suspected of making large-scale mili-
tary and financial commitments, were not disclosed to Congress.5
* This article was prepared from the "Executive Privilege Colloquim and
Lecture," delivered at the Villanova University School of Law, Tuesday, Oc-
tober 28, 1980. The accompanying Lecture by Professor Berger has been sup-
plemented by documentation and modified where necessary to accommodate
the written form.
Professor Berger is the author of Executive Privilege: A Constitutional
Myth (1974); War, Foreign Affairs, and Executive Secrecy, 72 Nw. U.L. REv.
309 (1978); War-making by the President, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 29 (1972);
The Presidential Monopoly of Foreign Relations, 71 MICH. L. REv. 1 (1972);
The Incarnation of Executive Privilege, 22 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 4 (1974).
1. Compare U.S. CONST. art. I with id. art. II.
2. G. WooD, TIE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787 162
(1969).
3. 1 THE WORKS OF JAMS WILSON 292 (R. McCloskey ed. 1967).
4. Id. at 292-93.
5. R. BERGER, ExECUTIVE PRIVILEGE: A CONSTITUTIONAL MYTH 140-56
(1974) [hereinafter cited as EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE]. Legislation now requires the
Secretary of State to transmit to the Congress the text of any international
agreement other than a treaty, to which the United States is a party, as soon as
practicable after such agreement has entered into force with respect to the
United States, but in no event later than 60 days thereafter. See I U.S.C.§ 112(b) (1976).
Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., suggests why new legislation was enacted:
In 1962 Secretary of State Rusk and [Thailand's] Foreign Minister
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Should an executive agreement for example, to come to the aid of
Pakistan be concealed?
The claim of uncontrolled executive discretion to withhold
information was articulated for the first time by the Eisenhower
administration as a riposte to Senator Joseph McCarthy's high-
handed investigation of the Army.6 But the fact that power may
be abused does not prove that it was not conferred. It fell to Chief
Justice Burger in the Nixon Tapes7 case to declare that the privi-
lege for presidential communications is "inextricably rooted in the
separation of powers under the Constitution." 8 That is a question-
begging formulation. The separation of powers does not generate
power; it only serves to protect granted power from encroachment.
Therefore, the threshold question must be, what does the separa-
tion of powers separate? What is the content of each separate
power? Regard it as a circle that has three different segments, and
look at each segment of the divided powers to see what it contains.
Inquiry begins with an examination of the scope of the respec-
tive powers in English practice. The Supreme Court held in Ex
expressed in a joint declaration "the firm intention of the United
States to aid Thailand ... in resisting communist aggression and sub-
version." While this statement may have been no more than a speci-
fication of SEATO obligations, the executive branch thereafter secretly
built and used bases and consolidated the Thai commitment in ways
that would still be unknown to Congress and the electorate had it not
been for the indomitable curiosity of Senator Symington and his Sub-
committee on Security Arrangements and Commitments Abroad. The
Subcommittee also uncovered interesting transaction involving the ex-
ecutive branch with Ethiopia (1960), Laos (1963) and South Korea
(1966).
Schlesinger, Congress and the Making of American Foreign Policy, 51 FORMGN
AFFAiRs 78, 100-01 (1972).
Examples of subsequently revealed secrets include a 1953 secret agreement
governing nonwithdrawal of combat troops stationed in Europe, and a long
range financial commitment made by the President in the form of $435 million
in promised credits and assistance in Portugal in exchange for a 25-month
extension of base rights in the Azores, see EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE, supra note 5,
at 140-41 n.120 citing C. SULZBERGER, A LONG ROW OF CANDLES 867, 923
(1969).
6. ExcUnvE PRIVILEGE, supra note 5, at 234. In a directive to the Secre-
tary of Defense, President Eisenhower instructed him to tell all Department of
Defense employees that they were not to testify before the Senate Committee
on Government Operations regarding any communications of the executive
branch and were not to produce any documents relating to such conversations.
100 CONG. REC. 6621 (1954).
7. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974). The Nixon case involved
President Nixon's assertion of absolute executive privilege in support of a mo-
tion to quash a third-party subpoena duces tecum issued by the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia, directing President Nixon to pro-
duce certain tape recordings and documents relating to his conversations with
aides and advisors during his term as President. Id. at 686, 703.
8. Id. at 708.
406 [VOL. 26: p. 404
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Parte Grossman,9 that the Constitution must be interpreted "by
reference to the common law and to British institutions as they
were when the instrument was framed and adopted." 10 Applying
that canon to congressional investigations (patently Congress was
modeled on the bicameral Parliament), the Court held in McGrain
v. Daugherty," a case arising out of the Teapot Dome scandal,
that
the power of inquiry . . .was regarded and employed as a
necessary and appropriate attribute of the power to legis-
late . . . . Thus ... the constitutional provisions which
commit the legislative function to the two houses are in-
tended to include this attribute to the end that the func-
tion may be effectively exercised.' 2
Thus, we have an established investigative power, found by the
Supreme Court to exist at English law before the adoption of the
Constitution, and held to be an inherent "attribute" of Congress.
To ascertain the scope of Parliament's power, I examined its
practice from 1621 to about 1750, and found a virtually unbroken,
plenary practice of inquiry into executive conduct across the board.13
Parliament commonly inquired into the conduct of war,14 expendi-
tures of public money 15 and - to lay a foundation for legislation -
how the laws were executed."' Before Parliament repealed or
revised a law, it wanted to know how the law had been working.
To find out, it interrogated the executive branch. With one ex-
plicable exception, to which I shall return, I found no executive
resistance to demands for information during this whole period.
In that exceptional instance, William Pitt, the great Chancellor,
summarizing the prior practice, declared: "We are called the Grand
Inquest of the Nation, and as such it is our Duty to inquire into
every Step of publick Management, either Abroad or at Home, in
9. 267 U.S. 87 (1925) (upholding the power of the President to grant
pardons, even for contempt of court offenses).
10. Id. at 108-09.
11. 273 U.S. 135 (1927) (Senate can compel a private individual to appear
before it or one of its committees for the purpose of giving testimony in regard
to an investigation ordered for a legitimate purpose).
12. Id. at 175.
13. EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE, supra note 5, at 15-31.
14. For several examples of Parliament's frequent probes into perceived
misconduct of the army in wartime, see EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE, supra note 5,
at 18; 3 H. HALLAM, TH-E CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND 143 (London
1884).
15. See EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE, supra note 5, at 19.
16. Id. at 19-20.
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order to see that nothing has been done amiss ... ," 17 Nothing
was excepted - domestic and foreign relations both were inquired
into by the Grand Inquest of the Nation. Thus, English practice
prior to the adoption of the Constitution discloses an untrammeled
legislative power of investigation. By the logic of McGrain,8 the
fact that the British executive did not claim the right to withhold
information from Parliament demonstrates that such a privilege
was not an attribute of the executive, and this was understood by
the Founders.
The Founders were familiar with the English practice and
intended to adopt it. There is time only to tick off a number of
proofs: (1) Montesquieu, oracle of the Founders on the separation
of powers, stated that the legislature "has a right and ought to have
the means of examining in what manner its laws have been exe-
cuted." 19 (2) James Wilson exalted the Commons as the Grand
Inquest of the Nation because it had "checked the progress of
arbitrary power .... The proudest ministers . . . have appeared
at the bar of the house, to give an account of their conduct .. .. " 20
In the Pennsylvania Ratification Convention, where he led the fight
for adoption of the Constitution, James Wilson stated: "The ex-
ecutive is better to be trusted when it has no screen ... [the Presi-
dent cannot] hide either his negligence or inattention . . . not a
single privilege is annexed to his character .... ,, 21 (3) Refer-
ences to the House as Grand Inquest of the Nation appear in the
several conventions.22 Not one voice was raised to urge curtailment
of the inquisitorial power in the interest of the President. That in
itself is an extraordinary fact. Had there been any inkling that it
was intended to have the President rise above the traditional prac-
tice, somebody would have said so. Such a suggestion was never
raised. Everybody took for granted that the executive would be
subject to inquiry by the Congress. (4) The Treasury Act of
178923 made the executive's duty to supply information explicit.
It provided in express terms that the Secretary of the Treasury
17. Id. at 29.
18. 273 U.S. at 161.
19. 1 C. DES. MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 231 (5th ed. London
1773), quoted in EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE, supra note 5, at 4.
20. 2 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 731 (R. McCloskey ed. 1967).
21. 2 J. ELLIOTr, DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 480 (2d ed. 1836), quoted in Exscu.
TIVE PRIVILEGE, supra note 5, at 49 (emphasis in original).
22. See EXECUTVE PRIVILEGE, supra note 5, at 35-36.
23. Act of Sept. 2, 1789, ch. 12, § 2, 1 Stat. 65 (current version at 31 U.S.C.§ 1001 (1976)).
[VOL. 26: p. 404
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should supply information to Congress. 24  This was an authorita-
tive construction by the First Congress, which is one of the most
valued sources of constitutional construction. (5) Attorney Gen-
eral Caleb Cushing held in 1854 that, "[b]y express provision of
the law, it is made the duty of the Secretary of the Treasury to
communicate information to either House of Congress when de-
sired; and it is practically and by legal implication the same with
other secretaries .... , 26
The thorniest area is that of confidential communications.
President Eisenhower expanded the confidential communica-
tions theory into an umbrella over the entire executive branch,
claiming that communications between employees of the executive
branch must be shielded in order that these employees may be com-
pletely candid in advising with each other.26  I wish I had time
to comment on the folly of this pronouncement, although one can
understand it in the heated atmosphere of Senator McCarthy's
inquiry into the Army. It was not long before extraordinary claims
for secrecy blossomed in the wake of this candid interchange doc-
trine.
Testifying before a Senate subcommittee in 1973, Attorney
General Richard Kleindienst asserted that the President is em-
24. Act of Sept. 2, 1789, ch. 12, § 2, 1 Stat. 65, 66 (current version at 31
U.S.C. § 1002 (1976)). The Act imposed upon the Secretary of the Treasury
the duty "to make report, and give information [to Congress], . . . respecting
all matters referred to him by the Senate or House of Representatives, or which
shall appertain to his office ..... ." Id.
25. 6 Op. Att'y Gen. 326, 333 (1854).
26. 100 CONG. Rrc. 6621 (1954). The statement was part of President
Eisenhower's directive to the Secretary of Defense regarding the appearance of
Department of Defense employees before the Senate Committee on Government
Operations. See note 5 supra. After President Eisenhower had invoked the
"candid interchange" doctrine, the withholding of information by government
administrators multiplied. EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE, supra note 5, at 236. Two
examples of the practice include the Department of Agriculture's withholding
of "'initialed file copies of an amendment' because 'they related solely to its
internal operations,' . . . [and its refusal] to submit a [1957] Farm Population
Estimate which had been withdrawn from distribution and destroyed." Id.,
quoting Kramer & Marcuse, Executive Privilege - A Study of the Period 1953-
1960 (pts. 1-2), 29 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 623, 658-59; 827, 877 (1961).
Historian Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., summed up the impact of the "candid-
interchange" doctrine as follows:
The Eisenhower directive ushered in the greatest orgy of executive
denial in American history. From June 1955 to June 1960 there were
at least 44 instances when officials in the executive branch refused in-
formation to Congress on the basis of the Eisenhower directive - more
cases in those five years than in the first century of American history
... . What had been for a century and a half sporadic executive
practice employed in very unusual circumstances was now in a brief
decade hypostatized into sacred constitutional principle.
A. Schlesinger, Jr., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY 15859 (1973).
1980-81]
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powered to forbid federal employees from testifying before Congress
under any circumstances and to block congressional demands for
any document within the executive branch, "even when called
upon to impeach the President." 27 How can Congress operate if
it is cut off from the two-and-one-half million members of the
bureaucracy which it created, which it funds, and to which it
delegates enforcement of the laws?
Communications between the President and his aides stand on
a higher level; what the President says to his Secretary of State or
Secretary of the Treasury in the secrecy of his cabinet is not com-
parable to consultations between clerks. But even communications
of this higher level are not insulated from inquiry, as the Nixon
Tapes 28 case taught. Although Chief Justice Burger held that
"the importance of this confidentiality is too plain to require fur-
ther discussion," 29 the Watergate scandal and the firestorm that
swept the nation after the "Saturday Night Massacre" 30 made the
withholding of the Nixon tapes unthinkable. So Chief Justice
Burger grudgingly made a breach in the separation of powers: the
privilege "cannot prevail," he said, "over the fundamental demands
of due process of law in the fair administration of criminal jus-
tice." 31
At the time, I prophesied that this "principle" would burgeon
by analogy, that the public interest in the criminal prosecution
of a White House aide hardly rose to its interest in the "full dis-
closure of all the facts" before Congress when it is engaged in in-
quiry into a Teapot Dome Scandal, or in the impeachment of the
President,8 2 or in weighing a missile limitation agreement with
27. 1 Executive Privilege; Secrecy in Government; Freedom of Information:
Hearings on S. 858, S. Con. Res. 30, S.J. Res. 72, S. 1106, S. 1142, S. 1520, S.
1923, and S. 2073 Before the Subcomm. on Intergovernmental Relations, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess. 18, 39 (1973) (statement of Richard G. Kleindienst). In dis-
cussing the extension of executive privilege, Attorney General Kleindienst
quoted President Nixon's statement that, "under the doctrine of separation of
powers, the manner in which the President personally exercises his assigned
executive powers is not subject to questioning by another branch of govern-
ment." Id. at 25.
28. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974). The Court emphasized
that "neither the doctrine of separation of powers, nor the need for confiden-
tiality of high-level communications, without more, can sustain an absolute,
unqualified Presidential privilege of immunity from judicial process under all
circumstances." Id. at 706.
29. Id. at 705.
30. The abrupt firing of special Watergate prosecutor Archibald Cox on
Saturday, Oct. 20, 1973. is referred to as the Saturday Night Massacre. See
THE WHITE HousE TRANSCRIPTS 866 (G. Gold ed. 1974).
31. 418 U.S. at 713. See notes 7-8 and accompanying text supra.
32. See Berger, The Incarnation of Executive Privilege, 22 U.C.L.A. L.
REv. 4, 8-9 (1974).
[VOL. 26: p. 404
6
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 26, Iss. 2 [1981], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol26/iss2/4
EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE
Russia. My prophecy was speedily fulfilled in the second Nixon
case, 3 when President Nixon once more invoked executive privilege
for confidential papers to shield some forty-two million pages of
documents that had poured into the White House from every quar-
ter of the government during his administration.
Although Chief Justice Burger, dissenting, stuck to his guns
and insisted that a breach in Presidential confidentiality was war-
ranted only when "the conduct of criminal proceedings would be
impaired," 34 the Court, no longer constrained to furnish Nixon with
a "definitive" decision (remember, President Nixon had said he
would only obey a definitive decision, which is why the whole
Court joined in the decision in the first case), held in the second
Nixon case 5 that, "the claims of Presidential privilege clearly
must yield to the important congressional purposes of preserving
the materials and maintaining access to them for lawful govern-
mental and historical purposes." 36 Protection of the public right
to information, upon which the second Nixon case was largely
pitched, is not nearly as important as the right of Congress to in-
quire into executive misconduct, to ascertain the facts, for example,
behind unauthorized entry into another Vietnam war. Thus, no
sooner had the claim of executive privilege received Chief Justice
Burger's imprimatur than it was rendered virtually meaningless.
The Court's decision in the second Nixon case37 was in ac-
cord with English precedent. As a prelude to the impeachment of
the Earl of Oxford and other high ministers in 1714, Parliament
examined Thomas Harley, the brother of Oxford, and Matthew
Prior, both envoys to France, interrogating them as to their in-
structions by the Ministers to negotiate a secret treaty behind the
back of the Dutch allies.38 Disclosure of such a scheme was dis-
graceful, for the resulting Treaty of Ultrecht, as William Pitt later
33. Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425 (1977). In the
second Nixon case, former President Richard Nixon challenged the validity of
the Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act, which directed the
Administrator of General Services to take custody of Nixon's presidential mate-
rials and have them screened by government archivists to eliminate personal
matter and to preserve those having historical value, making them available for
use in judicial proceedings. Id. at 429.
34. Id. at 515 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
35. Justices Stewart, Marshall, and Stevens joined Justice Brennan's opinion
for the Court. Justices White, Powell and Blackmun concurred in part. Chief
Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist each wrote dissenting opinions.
36. 433 U.S. at 454.
37. 433 U.S. 425 (1977). See notes 33-36 and accompanying text supra.
38. EXECUTIVE PRMLEGE, supra note 5, at 256.
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said, left an indelible stain on the honor of England.8 9 Neverthe-
less, nobody breathed a claim to executive privilege. A reflection
of this English precedent is found in the Jay Treaty incident. The
House requested President Washington to furnish the instructions
which had been given to the Minister who had negotiated the Jay
Treaty, justifying the request, apparently, because "it was neces-
sary to implement the treaty with appropriations." 40 Washington
refused the papers to the House on the ground that the treaty
power was exclusively vested in the President and Senate, leaving
the House without jurisdiction in the premises. 41 Washington
made certain, however, that "all the papers affecting the negotia-
tion[s] . . . were laid before the Senate" 42 - evidence that he did
not conceive that even his own communications were sacrosanct.
This was a treaty that excited vastly more vitriolic comment than
did the recent Panama Canal Treaties 43 or the termination of full
diplomatic recognition of Taiwan.
The issue of executive privilege is but one facet of the rela-
tionship between the President and Congress. Decisions to claim
the privilege originate in the bureaucracy, and, as Professor Wade
of Cambridge observed, bureaucrats have an "occupational love of
secrecy," and possess the "instinct of hiding as much as possible
from the public gaze," 44 as the post-McCarthy record teaches.45
39. Id.
40. Id. at 171, citing Mem. Att'y Gen., The Power of the President to
Withhold Information from the Congress, Senate Subcomm. on Const. Rights 5
(85th Cong., 2d Sess. 1958).
41. Washington further stated:
The nature of foreign negotiations requires caution; and their success
must often depend and even when brought to a conclusion, a full
disclosure of all the measures, demands, or eventual concessions which
may have been proposed or contemplated would be extremely im-
politic .... To admit, then, a right in the House of Representatives
to demand, and to have, as a matter of course, all the papers respect-
ing a negotiation with a foreign Power, would be to establish a
dangerous precedent.
5 ANNALS OF CONG. 760 (1796).
42. 5 ANNALS OF CONG. 760-61 (1796). President Washington further as-
serted: "I have no disposition to withhold any information which the duty of
my station will permit, or the public good shall require to be disclosed." Id.
at 760.
For a detailed discussion of the Jay Treaty incident, see EXECUTIVE
PRIVILEGE, supra note 5, at 171-79.
43. For a commentary favoring limitation of the President's role in treaty-
making and critical of the exclusion of the House from the disposition of the
Panama Canal, see Berger, Must The House Consent To Cession Of The
Panama Canal?, 64 CORNELL L. REV. 275 (1979).
44. EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE, supra note 5, at 214, citing H. WADE, ADMINIS-
TRATIVE LAw 18 (2d ed., Oxford, 1967).
45. EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE, supra note 5, at 236-51.
[VOL. 26: p. 404
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The claim of executive privilege is part of the unrelenting execu-
tive drive for ever more power. We need, therefore, to recall
Justice Brandeis' reminder that it was the deep-seated conviction of
the English and American people that they "must look to repre-
sentative assemblies for the protection of their liberties.1 46 Legis-
lative assemblies cannot function in the dark.
I am by no means suggesting to you that I regard the Con-
gress as a collection of latter-day saints. But Congress is a great
public town meeting where national issues can be debated and sen-
timent can be gauged.47  It is better to have government thus
operate in the open than behind a shroud of secrecy, a shroud that
produces Haldemans and what Attorney General Mitchell called a
"chamber of White House horrors."
46. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 294-95 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dis-
senting).
47. We must act quickly to abandon the role of mere spectators to a
cockfight between Congress and the President, and to realize that we
all have an immediate interest in ensuring that Congress be fully
informed not only in order to carry out its own functions but in the
process enlighten the electorate so that it can make informed judg-
ments.
Berger, Executive Privilege: A Reply to Professor Sofaer, 75 COLUM. L. REv.
602, 620 (1975).
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